Tag: Ron Mitchell

Increasing Access to Clean Water: Four Elements of Integrated Water Resources Management as Observed in Two Angolan Water Projects

Presenter: Julia Stafford (Political Science, History)

Mentor: Ron Mitchell

Oral Presentation

Panel C: “Explorations in Chemistry and Water” Oak Room

Concurrent Session 3: 1:45-3:00pm

Facilitator: Sheri Donahoe

By what means can we effectively deliver a bigger quantity of safe, clean water to more people? Integrated water resources management (IWRM) is the dominant framework, calling for the integration of every scale of stakeholder power to achieve increased clean water access. Participatory decision making, capacity building, public‐private partnerships, and valuation are four elements of IWRM that contribute to an effective water management project. Participatory mechanisms increase clean water access by incorporating the principle of subsidiarity. Capacity building creates sustainability by strengthening local resources that would otherwise restrict the expansion of clean water access. Public‐private partnerships alleviate pressure on public institutions which may be incapable of water management independently. Valuation increases the economic viability of water projects. In an evaluation of two IWRM projects in Angola, participatory mechanisms and capacity building are most prominent. In addition, each project reflects the mission of their supporting organization: a social focus for the United Nations Development Programme and an economic one for the World Bank. The United Nations’ project in Angola is more effective in increasing clean water access, validating their human rights and community‐ based project structure.

To What Degree Do Economic Circumstances Determine Compliance Costs That Consequently Push Like-Minded Nations Apart?

Presenter(s): Taylor Herman − Marine Biology, Environmental Science

Faculty Mentor(s): Ron Mitchell

Poster 158

Research Area: Political Science

Rainforest nations that are exposed to similar environmental conditions are often driven to implement different international policies out of economic necessity. The establishment of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations was intended to unite rainforest nations despite their differences. According to Vaahtoranta and Sprinz, countries are more likely to participate in coalitions if the costs of compliance are low. This paper will analyze the degree to which economic circumstance determines compliance costs that consequently push like-minded nations apart, using Costa Rica and Brazil as model nations. Though these are both rainforest nations, they each took different positions regarding their participation in the United Nations Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), which may be due to differences in economic standing.