Explaining the Negotiating Positions of Countries Within the Paris Agreement on Climate Change—An Interest-Based Approach

Presenter(s): Sulley Schuster − Political Science, Environmental Studies

Faculty Mentor(s): Ronald Mitchell, Craig Kauffman

Poster 123

Research Area: Social Science

Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) developed a theory that state positions within international environmental agreements are driven by two factors: environmental vulnerability and abatement costs. Furthermore, they posit that the interaction of these factors positions states as either pushers, intermediates, bystanders, or draggers in international environmental negotiations. The following study tests whether or not this theory can accurately predict the negotiating positions of states with the Paris Agreement by quantifying the ecological vulnerability and abatement costs of each participating state and comparing it to their observed negotiating position. The results of this analysis show that an interest-based theory can accurately predict negotiating positions around two-thirds of the time, and that ecological vulnerability and international environmental norms also play an important role in shaping negotiating positions within the Paris Agreement. These findings are important in understanding exactly how states develop their negotiating positions within complex international environmental agreements, and can provide policymakers with valuable tools to design future agreements in ways that motivate states to take stronger negotiating positions than they would have otherwise. Subsequent research questions include: Which specific cases fail to fit this theory and why? To what extent are other factors playing a role in leading states to be more, or less, supportive of climate policy than environmental vulnerability and abatement costs would predict?